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THE ORDER-MAINTENANCE AGENDA AS
LAND USE POLICY
NICOLE STELLE GARNETr-r*
"We used to have a nice neighborhood. We don't have it anymore....
I am scared to go out in the daytime.... I don't go to the store
because I am afraid. ..."
'7 have never had the terror that I feel everyday when I walk down
the streets of Chicago. "
-Testimony before the Chicago City
Council in favor of the Chicago Gang
Loitering Ordinance, 19921
In his short history of urban life, The City: A Global History, Joel
Kotkin argues that all successful cities have three core characteristics: they
are sacred, they are safe, and they are busy.2 Few would argue with
Kotkin's emphasis on city safety, or with his conviction that cities fail
unless they keep their citizens safe. City life has long depended upon two
kinds of security-the protection from invading outsiders and from devi-
ant insiders. Until quite recently, urban civilizations' very existence
depended upon the ability to repel invaders. Ancient cities-Assyrian,
Greek, Indian, Roman, and American-developed and flourished when
that security was established and foundered when it failed. As Kotkin
observes, the rise of city walls once marked the beginnings of an urban
society: when large walled towns first appeared in China (as early as 1110
B.C.E.), the characters for "wall" and for "city" were identical.3 Even
during the Pax Romana, when unprecedented security enabled the free
movement of people, goods, and ideas, many cities-especially on the
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1. Transcript of Proceedings before the City Council of Chicago, Committee on
Police and Fire 66-67 (May 15, 1997) (quoted in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
41, 101 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
2. JOEL KoTKIN, THE CITY: A GLOBAL HISTORY xix-xxii (2005).
3. Id. at 11.
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frontier-depended upon the protection of walls and legionaries.4 The
return of urban life to Europe in the centuries after the fall of Rome was
similarly marked by the "erecting [of) a defensive perimeter." 5
While protecting inhabitants from invading outsiders is no longer a
primary function of cities, local governments must continue to guarantee
their residents' security by adopting and enforcing the rules necessary to
protect them from deviant insiders. Indeed, many cities in the developing
world are crippled by a lack of internal security.6 In these places, those
citizens who can afford to do so retreat into guarded, walled, suburban
enclaves or emigrate abroad. Not long ago, many people expected Ameri-
can cities to suffer, in time, a similar fate. Crime rates rose dramatically
during the 1960s and 1970s, and then remained at unprecedented levels
despite increases in police expenditures. And as the crime rate rose, so did
fear of crime, especially in urban areas. Private security forces-from paid
security guards to the controversial "Guardian Angels"-began to patrol
the streets. 7 Along with the high crime rates, other factors-including
the decriminalization of public drunkenness and vagrancy, and the dein-
stitutionalization of the mentally ill-contributed to a crippling fear of
urban disorder. By the end of the 1980s, many of those who could do so
chose simply to avoid urban public spaces. Any informed observer might
have concluded that our cities were falling apart at their seams and that
any reasonable person would have cause to abandon them.'
According to Kotkin, one critical element in the late-twentieth-cen-
tury revival in some American cities is "the adoption of new policing
methods and a widespread determination to make public safety the num-
ber one priority of government."9 His assertion is a plausible one. Since
the publication in 1982 of James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's influ-
ential essay, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,'0
4. Id. at 32-33.
5. Id. at 66.
6. Id at 126-146.
7. NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND
THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 127 (2009).
8. On the effects of crime and disorder, see, for example, PAUL GROGAN & TONY
PROSCIO, COMEBACK CrIES 152 (2000) ("Out of control crime was the nearly universal
expectation for the inner city. Any other positive trend there ... was sharply hemmed in
by the prospect of continued crime and, just as important, an all but unshakable fear of
crime."); George Kelling & Mark Moore, From Political to Reform to Communit. The
Evolving Strategy of Police, in POUCE AND SOCIETY 15 (David H. Bayley ed., 1977) ("Cit-
izens abandoned parks, public transportation, neighborhood shopping centers, churches,
as well as entire neighborhoods."); GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, Fix-
ING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMU-
NIES 40-60 (1996); Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces:
Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996).
9. KOTKIN, supra note 2, at 154-55.
10. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neigh-
borhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
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urban policies focusing on curbing disorder, such as former Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani's "quality of life" and "no tolerance" programs, as well
as "community policing" efforts, have become ubiquitous." This "order-
maintenance revolution" is, at its heart, motivated by the desire to make
our cities safer. From their inception, order-maintenance reforms have
flowed from a conviction that the dominant post-war "law enforcement"
model of policing-which focused on solving crimes rather than prevent-
ing them-was ineffective, if not counter-productive.
12
In their essay, Wilson and Kelling first articulated the influential
"broken windows hypothesis," which posits that uncorrected manifesta-
tions of disorder, even minor ones like broken windows, signal a break-
down in the social order that accelerates neighborhood decline and
generates more serious crime.1 3 The broken windows hypothesis has gen-
erated a vast academic literature, most of which falls into two broad, and
overlapping, categories: the first concerning the efficacy of order-mainte-
nance policing tactics; the second concerning these policies' civil-liberties
consequences. In the first debate, social norms scholars argue that disor-
der is a precursor to more serious deviancy and crime, and, therefore,
that order-maintenance policing strategies are needed to keep disorder in
check.14 As Dan Kahan has observed, "[c] racking down on aggressive
panhandling, prostitution, open gang activity and other visible signs of
disorder may be justifiable on this ground, since disorderly behavior and
the law's response to it are cues about the community's attitude toward
more serious forms of criminal wrongdoing." 15 Efforts to test this claim
have generated a voluminous empirical literature, with scholars sharply
divided over the meaning of the available data.' 6
11. See, e.g., Debra A. Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 577 (1997).
12. See, e.g., KELLING & COLES, supra note 8, at 85-89 (describing collapse of
reform-era policing strategies by the 1970s).
13. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 10, at 31.
14. For comprehensive treatments of the "social influence" justification for order-
maintenance policing, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning,
and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 367-73 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence];
Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REv.
1513, 1527-1538 (2002).
15. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 14, at 351.
16. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL
OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 65-84 (1990) (finding causal connection
between disorder and robbery rates); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER:
THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 128-30 (2001) (challenging Sko-
gan's findings); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Obser-
vation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. Soc.
603, 612-29 (1999) (finding disorder was correlated with robbery, but questioning
causal connection between disorder and serious crime); George L. Kelling & William H.
Sousa, Jr., Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of New York City ' Police Reforms
(Manhattan Inst. Ctr. for Civic Innovation, Civic Report No. 22, Dec. 2001) (attributing
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In the second debate, civil liberties and criminal procedure scholars
focus on the constitutional questions raised by the discretion afforded
police officers by order-promoting criminal laws. Many worry that order-
maintenance policing techniques threaten to undermine hard-earned civil
liberties victories and open the door to police abuses, especially by erod-
ing the constitutional limits on police discretion. 7 In response, order-
maintenance proponents assert that skepticism of the police is outdated
and, moreover, actually harms the very people that civil libertarians wish
to protect, namely the poor minority residents of disorder-ravaged inner
city neighborhoods. 8
These debates focus almost exclusively on whether the order-main-
tenance agenda represents wise criminal law policy-specifically on
whether, when, and at what cost, order-maintenance policing techniques
reduce serious crime. These questions are important, but, as I have previ-
ously written, incomplete. In particular, academic debates about the
order-maintenance revolution tend to overlook the complex and impor-
tant role of property regulation in order-maintenance efforts.' 9 This
oversight is problematic for a number of reasons, including the fact that
focusing on order-maintenance policies exclusively through the lens of
the criminal law may cause commentators to miss what might be called
"land use" benefits (and costs) of the order maintenance agenda.
Although land use policies focus primarily on the regulation of private
property, their goal has long been to maximize overall community health.
Therefore, evaluating order-maintenance policies through the lens of
land use policy lends itself to a more holistic consideration of benefits
other than crime reduction.20
This Essay seeks to fill in this critical gap in the current understand-
ing of order-maintenance policies. It considers benefits other than crime
reduction, especially reducing the fear of crime (even when the crime
dramatic decline in crime in New York City to aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy);
Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J. L. & ECON.
235, 262 (2005) (analyzing data from New York and finding that aggressive misdemeanor
arrest policy led to decrease in incidents of violent crime); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens
Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence fom New York City and a Five-City Social Experi-
ment, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 271, 275-77 (2006) (challenging these New York City studies).
17. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Rights and Interests, in URGENT TIMES: POLIC-
ING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 33-39 (Tracey L. Meares & Dan M.
Kahan eds., 1999); [hereinafter URGENT TIMES]; Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong than
Rights, in URGENT TIMES supra, at 49-57; Margaret A. Burnham, Twice Victimized, in
URGENT TIMES supra, at 63-69.
18. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Proce-
dure, 86 GEO. L. J. 1153, 1159-1171 (1998); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When
Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 17, at
3-30.
19. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1
(2004); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. Rev. 1075 (2005).
20. GARNETr, supra note 7, at 128-29.
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itself does not decrease). The Broken Windows essay itself urged that
attention to disorder was important not just because disorder was a pre-
cursor to more serious crime, but also because disorder undermined
residents' sense of security.21 The later scholarly explications of the bro-
ken windows hypothesis also emphasize the connection between restor-
ing the perception of security and its reality.2 2 One reason that social
norms scholars link disorder and crime is that disorder has a predictable
effect on law-abiding citizens: those with financial resources move away
from, or choose not to move into, disorderly neighborhoods; those with-
out resources remain inside and avoid public places. Even if these reac-
tions (somewhat surprisingly) do not lead to more crime in a
community, they certainly disadvantage city neighborhoods vis-A-vis
their suburban alternatives.2 3 Moreover, and importantly, the goals of
reducing crime and of helping poor, inner-city residents feel better about,
and more vested in, their communities are not necessarily coterminous;
order-maintenance policies might achieve the latter without achieving
the former. In other words, it might be the case that order-maintenance
policies do not curb serious crime and that they make cities more attrac-
tive places to live, for both current and potential residents.
I. BEYOND CRIME REDUCTION
To begin, it is important to emphasize that not all order-mainte-
nance policies are policing strategies. Nor are all they all crime-reduction
strategies, solely predicated on the existence of a causal link between dis-
order and more serious crime. Many order-maintenance policies are bet-
ter understood as urban development strategies. They primarily aim to
improve the quality of life in disorder-plagued urban neighborhoods,
both for the sake of current residents and as a strategy for attracting
newcomers. Certainly curbing crime, especially violent crime, is one of
the most important ways to improve many urban neighborhoods. Vio-
lence is, unfortunately, the single most pressing quality-of-life issue fac-
ing many Americans today, especially the urban poor. But the broad
array of policies falling under the order-maintenance umbrella-street
21. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 10, at 29, 35.
22. On the perception of security versus its reality, see, for example, Cm. CMTY.
POLICING EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, YEAR TEN:
AN EVALUATION OF CHICAGO'S ALTERNATIVE POLICING STRATEGY 66 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO]. On safety as a factor influencing housing
choice, see NAT'L Ass'N OF HOME BUILDERS, 2005 MULTIFAMILY RENTER AND CONDO
BUYER PREFERENCE SURVEY 20-21 (2005), available at http://www.nahb.orglgeneric.
aspx?genericContentlD=46103; PUB. POL'Y INST. OF CAL., SPECIAL SURVEY ON LAND
USE 7 (2002), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/S-1102MBS.pdf;
Lee Sigelman & Jeffrey R. Henig, Crossing the Great Divide: Race and Preferences for Liv-
ing in the City Versus the Suburbs, 37 URB. AFF. REV. 3, 7-8 (2001).
23. GARNETT, supra note 7, at 132-40.
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sweeping and litter pickup, graffiti and junk removal, "weed and seed"
programs targeting rubble-strewn abandoned lots, the demolition of
abandoned buildings, and policies aimed at curbing the common "social
disorders," such as public drinking, prostitution and drug dealing-may
generate a number of benefits, even if they do nothing to reduce serious
crime. This Essay focuses primarily on one potential benefit-reducing
the fear of crime-but there are many others, including, importantly,
simply improving the residents' quality of life in our poorest
communities.
A. Fear of Crime
In Broken Windows, Wilson and Kelling admitted-on the first
page of their essay-that order-maintenance policing will not necessarily
reduce crime. The essay was prompted by the Newark Foot Patrol Exper-
iment, which increased the presence of police officers "walking the beat"
instead of driving patrol cars. Kelling participated in an evaluation of the
program, which found, in Wilson and Kelling's words, that "to the sur-
prise of hardly anyone . . . foot patrols had not reduced crime rates."24
Despite this, however, Wilson and Kelling still concluded that the foot
patrols had made the affected neighborhoods safer. They reasoned that
"residents of the foot-patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more
secure[,] . .. tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed
to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime (staying at home
with the doors locked, for example)." 2 5
Wilson and Kelling's admission that foot patrols had not caused
crime rates to fall reflects their understanding, from its inception, that
the order-maintenance enterprise is not just about reducing serious
crime. It is also, perhaps primarily, about improving residents' sense of
security. This distinction is important, especially because the available
empirical evidence suggests that people tend to systematically overestimate
the threat of crime. In other words, we tend to feel less safe than we
actually are. Consider, for example, the most recent evaluation of Chi-
cago's Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) program, a comprehensive
community policing effort that focuses on addressing crime and disorder
at the neighborhood level. The program assigns officers to one of 279
beats in the city. In order to maximize their "turf orientation," police
officers are given long-term assignments and made primarily responsible
for responding to calls in their beat. CAPS officers also hold monthly
community meetings in their beats, and District Advisory Committees,
made up of residents, community leaders, business owners, and other
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id.; see generally George Kelling, THE NEwAm FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT
(1981).
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stakeholders meet regularly with police leaders to discuss community
priorities.26
Over the first ten years of the CAPS program, crime declined dra-
matically in Chicago (in keeping with national trends): robbery declined
by 58 percent, rape by 45 percent, murder by 30 percent, aggravated
assault by 41 percent, burglary by 51 percent, and motor vehicle theft by
47 percent.27 Promisingly, crime declined most dramatically in the Afri-
can-American neighborhoods where violent crime was disproportionately
concentrated during the early 1990s. Latino neighborhoods also exper-
ienced sharper declines than white neighborhoods.2 8 Public perceptions
of the city's crime also improved during this time period. Surveys found
that both African-American and white residents reported that crime fell
sharply between 1993 and 2003. Importantly, African-American percep-
tions of the crime problem, which were historically the most pessimistic,
began to converge with the perceptions of white residents. Official crime
statistics, however, suggest that crime actually declined more than the
public perception of crime. While both African-American and white
residents felt that their neighborhoods were much safer in 2003 than in
1993, the trends in officially recorded crime were even more positive;
that is, crime fell more sharply than Chicago residents thought that it
did. The divergence between survey data and recorded crime was most
dramatic in predominantly Spanish-speaking Latino neighborhoods.
Spanish-speaking Latinos reported a significant increase in crime, despite
the fact that official statistics suggest it trended sharply downward.2 9
The CAPS report also found that fear of crime in Chicago also has
declined dramatically.3" Fear of crime is distinct from public perceptions
of crime, as it incorporates individuals' predictions about the likelihood
of future victimization. Importantly, because an individual's evaluation
of his or her vulnerability also reflects a predictive judgment about the
likelihood of public or private intervention to prevent or mitigate the
effects of crime, fear of crime is an important variable for gauging both
police performance and the level of social capital in a community.
Between 1993 and 2003, fear of crime fell across all demographic groups
in Chicago. Fear was down by 10 percent among men and younger peo-
ple-two traditionally low-fear groups; it fell twenty percentage points
among the groups that traditionally expressed the greatest level of fear-
women, African Americans, and the elderly. 31
26. See generally COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, supra note 22.
27. Id. at 52-54.
28. Id. at 54-57.
29. Id. at 61-64.
30. Id. at iv-v, 54-55, 66-72.
31. Id.
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B. Fear vs. Reality
For many years, conventional wisdom held that crime was the pri-
mary cause of fear of crime. Beginning in the 1960s, however, as fear of
crime increased dramatically, it became clear that the association between
fear and victimization is complicated, and that other factors influence
how fearful an individual feels. 32 This is hardly surprising. To begin, not
all crime is reported, so crime statistics systematically underestimate the
extent of the actual crime problem. Surveys can partially remedy this
problem by asking residents to report whether they were themselves vic-
tims of crime or know of friends and neighbors who have been victim-
ized. Survey data may be particularly helpful in gauging the extent of
under-policed criminal activity, including classic "social disorder" crimes
such as gangs, drug dealing, and prostitution. For these crimes, arrest and
incident reports tend to reflect the level of police effort rather than the
extent of the actual problem.33 Unfortunately, however, surveys likely
overcompensate for the underreporting problem. Respondents may tend
to overstate the prevalence of crime, especially because informal and
media reports of crime tend to have an amplification effect. For many
Americans who have not been victimized, vicarious experiences become
their primary contact with crime. Especially because these vicarious
experiences often result from sensationalized media accounts of the least
common, and most gruesome and bizarre, crimes, survey respondents
may distort the extent and distribution of crime.3 4
Fear of crime is even more difficult to measure than the public per-
ception of crime levels. There are no official "fear" statistics. Any effort to
gauge the extent of fear necessarily depends upon self-reporting, usually
in surveys, and survey results vary dramatically depending on the ques-
tions used to measure crime. Traditionally, researchers have divided over
whether to gauge fear levels by asking about personal concern about
crime, about the perceived risk of victimization, or about precautions
taken to avoid crime.35 By any measure, however, fear of crime is a sig-
nificant urban problem. For example, a 2005 Gallup poll reported that
38 percent of Americans responded "yes" when asked whether "there is
any area near where you live-that is, within a mile-where you would
32. See Mark H. Moore & Robert C. Trojanowicz, Policing and Fear of Crime, 3
PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING 3 (June 1988).
33. See COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, supra note 22.
34. BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF
THE WRONG THINGS 44-45 (1999); Terance D. Miethe, Fear and Withdrawalfrom
Urban Life, 539 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 14, 17 (1995); Barrett A. Lee,
The Urban Unease Revisited: Perceptions of Local Safety and Neighborhood Satisfaction
Among Metropolitan Residents, 62 Soc. Sci. Q. 4 (1981).
35. Wesley Skogan, Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder, and Fear, in MEA-
SURING WHAT MATTERS: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE POLICING INSTITUTE MEETINGS 37,
47-48 (Robert H. Langworthy ed., 1999).
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be afraid to walk alone at night."36 Surveys soliciting information about
specific crimes (assault, burglary, rape, murder) generally find lower levels
of fear. Perhaps because a respondent's assessment of her level of fear
reflects some combination of perceived risk and the perceived seriousness
of the offense, people are not necessarily most fearful of serious, violent
crimes.37
The relationship between personal experience with crime and fear is
also unclear. The theory of "indirect victimization" suggests that fear is
more widespread than victimization because hearing about other people's
experiences with crime causes nonvictims to become frightened. 38 For
this reason, there is some evidence that strong local social ties may
amplify fear, apparently because neighborhood gossip is an efficient way
to distribute information about recent crimes in an area.3 9 Most research
suggests that prior direct experience with crime is weakly correlated with
increased fear, although some authors have suggested that victimization
actually may reduce fear under certain circumstances. (The theory being
that some victims fear the worst and experience relief when they survive
an incident relatively unscathed.)4" Somewhat paradoxically, the groups
with the highest levels of fear-women and the elderly-have the lowest
rates of victimization; and those with the highest rates of victimization-
young men-have the lowest. (These findings are consistent with the
"indirect victimization" phenomenon, since older women are more phys-
ically vulnerable than younger men.)4 1
36. Carroll, Joseph, Gallup Reviews Americans' Attitudes about Crime, GALLUP
NEws SERV., June 16, 2006, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/23365/Gallup-
Reviews-Americans-Attitudes-About-Crime.aspx.
37. Miethe, supra note 34, at 17; Mark Warr & Mark Stafford, Fear of Victimiza-
tion, A Look at Proximate Causes, 61 Soc. FORCES 1033 (1984).
38. See WESLEY SKOGAN & MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD, COPING WITH CRIME
200-06 (1986); Jeannette Covington & Ralph Taylor, Fear of Crime in Urban Residential
Neighborhoods: Implications of Between- and Within-Neighborhoods for Current Models, 32
Soc. Q. 231, 232 (1991).
39. Covington & Taylor, supra note 38, at 232; Lauren B. Gates & William M.
Rohe, Fear and Reactions to Crime: A Revised Model, 22 URB. AFF. R. 425, 439 (1987).
40. On the connection between crime and fear, see Chris L. Gibson et al., Social
Integration: Individual Perceptions of Collective Efficacy and the Fear of Crime in Three
Cities, 19 JUST. Q. 537, 540 (2002) (discussing literature examining link between fear of
crime and victimization); Allen E. Liska et al., Fear of Crime and Constrained Behavior:
Specifying and Estimating the Reciprocal Effects Model, 66 Soc. FORCES 827, 827-36
(1988); Wesley G. Skogan, The Impact of Victimization on Fear, 33 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 135 (1987); Gates & Rohe, supra note 39. On the possibility that victimization
may reduce fear, see RICHARD F. SPARKS ET AL., SURVEYING VICTIMS (1977).
41. See, e.g., Miethe, supra note 344, at 19; Covington & Taylor, supra note 38, at
231-32; Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Neighborhood Disorder, Integration, and the Fear of
Crime, 14 JUST. Q. 479, 480 (1997); Gibson et al., supra note 40, at 540; James Garofalo
& John Laub, Fear of Crime: Broadening Our Perspective, 3 Victimology 242 (1978).
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II. THE COSTS OF FEAR
In his 1968 essay, The Urban Unease, James Q. Wilson argued that
fear (or unease) brought about by the failure of community was the root
of the so-called "urban crisis."4 2 At least since that time, fear of crime has
been considered a serious impediment to urban health, for a number of
related reasons discussed below.
A. Economic Costs of Precaution-Taking
First, when individuals are fearful, they tend to take steps to mini-
mize the risk of victimization. (Indeed, the level of precaution-taking in a
community is a common measure of fearfulness.) These precautions are
costly. Americans spend more on these private precautions-estimates
range from $160 billion to $300 billion-than on the total U.S. law
enforcement budget. In other words, private individuals spend more to
avoid being victimized than U.S. governments at all levels (federal, state
and local) spend on police, prosecutors, judges, and prisons.4 3 And, these
figures do not reflect the total cost of crime avoidance, such as the oppor-
tunity costs of remaining inside behind locked doors to avoid victimiza-
tion. Many economists condemn private crime prevention measures as
socially wasteful, reasoning that private precautions do not reduce the
total amount of crime, but rather simply displace it. That is, precautions
only deter criminals from victimizing protected individuals, not from
committing crimes. Instead, criminals will choose to victimize those who
have not taken steps to protect themselves.
44
B. The Social-Capital Costs of Precaution- Taking
Private precautions ultimately may prove counterproductive for
another reason. If social influence theory is correct, steps taken to avoid
crime may have the perverse effect of increasing its prevalence. Social
influence theory predicts that people will be law-abiding when they per-
ceive that their neighbors are obeying the law.45 But private actions taken
to avoid victimization cannot, by definition, support such a perception.
Logically, would-be victims should not take steps to protect themselves
from victimization if their neighbors are law-abiding; they will take pre-
42. James Q. Wilson, The Urban Unease: Community v. City, 12 PuB. INT. 25
(1968).
43. See generally Robert A. Mikos, "Eggshell" Victims, Private Precautions, and the
Societal Benefits of Shiing Crime, 105 MICH. L. REv. 307 (2006).
44. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICs 476 (4th
ed. 2004); Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal
Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 299 (1996); Steven Shavell,
Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private v. Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT'L REv.
L & ECON. 123 (1991).
45. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 14, at 367-73.
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cautions only if they believe themselves to be surrounded by criminals.
This is one reason why the "depolicing" advocates of the 1980s may have
erred. Depolicing proponents worried that a community can become too
dependent upon official police protection, leading individuals to under
invest in private efforts to prevent and address crime.46 Yet, the private
deterrence measures that fearful individuals are most likely to take-
including neighborhood watch groups, alarm systems, extra locks, bars
on windows, etc.-tend to signal that crime is prevalent in a community.
Moreover, monetary estimates of prevention-related expenditures
fail to capture the cost of reduced social capital resulting from fear. The
concept of social capital is the subject of a voluminous literature.47 For
the purpose of this discussion, however, Robert Putnam's "lean and
mean" definition of social capital-"social networks and the [associated]
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness"-suffices. 48 Fear undoubtedly
impedes a community's ability to generate and capitalize upon social cap-
ital in a number ways. The first is related to the social-influence effects of
prevention. When a resident takes steps to prevent victimization, espe-
cially visible steps such as installing bars on her windows, she may signal
to her neighbors that she does not trust them. Even if neighbors do not
interpret precautionary measures as evincing a lack of trust-perhaps
because the community is plagued by criminals from other neighbor-
hoods-precautionary measures may have other deleterious effects. Con-
sider, for example, the likely effects of one of the simplest and most
common crime-avoidance strategies-remaining indoors. As Jane Jacobs
influentially argued, the presence of law abiding residents in a commu-
nity's public spaces provides "eyes on the street" that keep crime and
disorder in check.4 9 Thus, when law-abiding, but fearful, residents
remain indoors to avoid victimization, they deprive their community of
private surveillance opportunities. As a result, frightened residents may
effectively become prisoners in their own homes, forced to turn the pub-
lic spaces in a community over to their would-be victimizers.
The "prisoner-in-my-own-home" phenomenon may also have the
deleterious effect of reducing the social capital generated by informal,
inter-neighbor socialization.5" In urban neighborhoods, an important
predictor of both actual crime and fear of crime is what sociologists and
46. See DONALD BLACK & M.P. BAUMGARTNER, On Self-Help in Modem Society,
in THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 193, 195-99 (1980).
47. See generally DAVID HALPERN, SOCIAL CAPITAL (2004) for a comprehensive
literature review.
48. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
49. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 45-55
(1961).
50. See Wesley Skogan, Fear of Crime and Neighborhood Change, in COMMUNITIES
AND CRIME, 203, 210-24 (Albert J. Reiss Jr. & Michael Tonry eds., 1988).
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social psychologists call "collective efficacy," or the "ability of neighbor-
hoods to realize the common goals of residents and maintain effective
social control." 5' Collective efficacy is sometimes defined as a form of
social capital, although it might be better understood as one way in
which members of a community can successfully harness social capital.
Collective efficacy, and the social capital that enables it, is critically
important to neighborhood health. As James Q. Wilson explained in The
Urban Unease-
It is primarily at the neighborhood level that meaningful (i.e.,
potentially rewarding) opportunities for the exercise of urban citi-
zenship exist. And it is the breakdown of neighborhood con-
trols ... that accounts for the principal concerns of urban citizens.
When they can neither take for granted nor influence by their
actions and those of their neighbors the standards of conduct
within their own neighborhood community, they experience what
to them are "urban problems .... 52
Wilson's observations, made over four decades ago, proved prescient:
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated both that neighborhoods
with low levels of collective efficacy are more dangerous than those with
higher levels, and that residents of such neighborhoods also are more
fearful. 53 Some studies suggest that low levels of perceived social control
have a greater effect on fear of crime than actual crime rates and previous
victimization. Not surprisingly, a resident who counts on her neighbors
to address community problems has less cause to fear victimization.
4
C. Crime, Fear, and Residential Sorting
Finally, and importantly, safety-reflected both in actual crime
rates and the perceived risk of victimization-strongly influences residen-
tial location decisions. In his 1956 essay, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures, Charles Tiebout influentially hypothesized that municipalities use
51. See generally Robert Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Mul-
tilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Sci. 918 (1997); Tracey Meares, Praying for Com-
munity Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1604 (2002).
52. See Wilson, supra note 42, at 28.
53. See Gibson et al., supra note 40, at 542 (collecting literature); A. Hunter &
T.L. Baumer, Street Traffic, Social Integration & Fear of Crime, 52 Soc. INQUIRY 123, 131
(1982); DAN A. LEWIS & GRETA SALEM, FEAR OF CRIME: INCIVILITY AND THE PRODUC-
TION OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM (1986); Pamela Wilcox Rountree & Kenneth C. Land,
Burglary Victimization, Perceptions of Crime Risk, and Routine Activities: A MultilevelAnal-
ysis Across Seattle Neighborhoods and Census Tracts, 33 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 147
(1996).
54. See, e.g., Matthew R. Lee & Terri L. Earnest, Perceived Community Cohesion
and Perceived Risk of Victimization: A Cross-National Analysis, 20 JUST. Q. 131, 138
(2003); Pamela Wilcox, et al., Busy Places and Broken Windows?: Toward Defining the Role
and Physical Structure and Process in Community Crime Models, 45 Soc. Q. 185, 186
(2004); Gibson et al., supra note 40, at 552, 558-59.
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public goods to compete for residents, or "consumer voters." 5 According
to the Tiebout model, which has been tested and refined extensively over
the past half century, residents "sort" themselves within a metropolitan
area according to their preferences for municipal services, which munici-
palities package and offer as an inducement to relocate. As Tiebout
observed, "[e]very resident who moves to the suburbs to find better
schools, more parks, and so forth, is reacting, in part, against the pattern
that the city has to offer." 56 Although Tiebout did not mention it specifi-
cally, safety, which might be defined in public-goods terms as effective
police protection, undoubtedly is one of the public goods influencing
residential sorting.
If Tiebout is correct, then cities that succeed in convincing residents
and would-be residents that they are, relatively speaking, safe-by actu-
ally reducing crime rates, by bolstering collective efficacy, or by undertak-
ing policing practices that bolster residents' sense of security-are more
likely to prosper than those that fail to do so. Why? It is fairly well
accepted that crime and the fear of crime both work to undermine urban
residential stability. In one nationwide study, for example, Julie Cullen
and Steven Levitt found a strong correlation between crime and urban
flight-each reported city crime correlated with a one-person decline in
city population, and a ten percent increase in crime corresponded to a
one-percent decline in city population.5 7 Cullen and Levitt also found
that residents motivated to move by fear of crime were more likely to
remain in the same metropolitan area than those moving for other rea-
sons, which also supports the conclusion that fear of crime has
encouraged out migration to the suburbs.58 Moreover, Cullen and Lev-
itt's study focused on the connection between actual crime and out
migration, that is, moves from the city to suburbs. It is reasonable to
assume that the fear of crime exerts at least as robust an influence on
residents' decisions about whether to move from one city neighborhood
to another, with safer neighborhoods enjoying greater residential stabil-
ity-that is, they have relatively low levels of resident turnover and high
levels of homeownership-than more dangerous ones. And, importantly,
even studies that question the connection between fear and out migration
suggest that crime exerts a relatively strong, and negative, influence on
55. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Evpenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956).
56. Id. at 420. See generally THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES (William A. Fischel, ed. 2006).
57. Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the Conse-
quences for Cities, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159 (1999).
58. Id. at 165-66. See also, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & John D. Wooldredge, Evi-
dence That High Crime Rates Encourage Migration Away from Central Cities, 70 Soc. Sci.
REv. 4 (July 1986).
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in-migration-that is, on the decision to move from the suburbs to the
city. 59
This connection between fear of crime and residential stability is
important because residential stability is strongly correlated with collec-
tive efficacy. In a major study of 343 Chicago neighborhoods, Robert
Sampson, Stephen Raudenbush, and Felton Earls found that residential
stability, measured by average residential tenure and levels of homeown-
ership, was one of three major factors explaining neighborhood variation
in collective efficacy. They also found that collective efficacy, in turn,
mediated the negative effects of the other two factors-economic disad-
vantage and immigration-enough to reduce violent victimization in a
community.6 ° These findings are consistent with other social science
research linking residential tenure and homeownership, especially of sin-
gle-family homes, with high levels of collective efficacy.6 1 The connec-
tion between homeownership and residential tenure is, of course, easily
explained. A resident's social integration into her neighborhood naturally
increases over time, increasing the likelihood that she will build the kind
of trust relationships with her neighbors that form the foundation of
collective efficacy.62 Moreover, homeowners have obvious financial
incentives to organize with one another to address neighborhood
problems that more temporary residents lack. This is one reason that fear
of crime is a particularly salient land-use factor: Although home owner-
ship raises the costs associated with moving and therefore may produce a
kind of residential stickiness, highly educated wealthier households with
children also are most responsive to crime-that is, most likely to relo-
cate when they become fearful. 63 These likely homeowners are also the
very residents most needed to promote collective efficacy.
That is not to say that security is the only, or even the primary,
factor influencing most people's decisions about where to live. Migration
to the suburbs began long before public attention became intensely
focused on the "urban crisis" in the postwar years.64 Most people move
away from urban neighborhoods for reasons other than fear of crime,
especially for so-called "life-cycle factors" such as a desire for more space
and better public schools brought about by the birth of children. Perhaps
recognizing this reality, many cities now seek to promote a "hip" image
59. See Martin D. Katzman, The Contribution of Crime to Urban Decline, 17 URB.
STUD. 277 (1980). But see Cullen & Levitt, supra note 57, at 159 ("[T]he link between
changes in crime and in-migration appears weak.").
60. Sampson et al., supra note 51, at 923.
61. McGarrell et al., supra note 41, at 484; Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note
16, at 610 ("Systemic theories of urban communities... have long pointed to the impor-
tance of residential stability as a major feature of urban social organization.").
62. Gibson et al., supra note 40, at 552.
63. Cullen & Levitt, supra note 57, at 159-69.
64. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106
MIcH. L. REv. 277, 280-87 (2007).
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in order to compete for young, childless professionals. For example, a
2003 New York Times article reported that cities like Memphis, Tennes-
see and Cincinnati, Ohio were "on a hunt for ways to put sex in the
city:"
In the same way that companies during the dot-corn boom tried
to present their offices as playgrounds, adding slides and masseurs,
cities are now getting in on the act. In Michigan, Gov. Jennifer M.
Granholm encouraged the mayors of 200 towns to form 'cool
commissions' to attract and retain the state's young people. In Bal-
timore, a nonprofit group called Live Baltimore Home Center,
partly financed by the city, has gone after young professionals as
'low hanging fruit.'
6 5
The logic of this strategy is obvious: Seek out the kind of would-be
residents who can "risk moving to neighborhoods with subpar school
systems, fixer-upper housing stock or a little street crime ... "66 The
"young and hip" strategy also may draw in educated and creative young
people-the very cohort that Richard Florida argued, in his influential
2002 book, The Rise of the Creative Class, modern cities must attract in
order to thrive. Cities, according to Florida, "have become the prime
location for the creative lifestyle and the new amenities that go with it;"
they are benefiting from the energy provided by creative young profes-
sionals, who stay single longer than in previous generations, and who
prefer to live in diverse, urban neighborhoods.
6 7
Florida's work has been subjected to stinging criticism, 68 but he
does capture a sense of the changing aesthetics of urban and suburban
life. As Robert Bruegmann argues in his recent history of suburbia, the
very economic changes lamented by many scholars of urban life-includ-
ing the decline in the urban industrial base-6 9 -ultimately may save our
cities. Freed from the congestion, pollution, and disease that once charac-
terized urban life, cities will become more attractive to the "creative class"
and other wealthy individuals who might previously have chosen to live
in the suburbs. As Bruegmann has argued, "[i]t is quite possible that
sprawl could recede everywhere as more citizens become affluent enough
to live like the residents of the Upper East Side," because "as individuals
pass from affluent to extraordinarily affluent they are better able to enjoy
65. John Leland, On a Hunt fbr Ways to Put Sex in the City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2003, at Fl.
66. Id.
67. RIcHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE Class 287-88 (2002).
68. See, e.g., Alec MacGillis, The Ruse of the Creative Class, AM. PROSPEcT, Jan. 4,
2010, at 12; Joel Kotkin, Uncool Cities, PROSPET, Oct. 22, 2005, http://www.prospect
magazine.co.uk/2005/10/uncoolcities.
69. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 25-35 (1996)
(linking inner-city crisis to decline in the urban industrial base).
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the benefits of density without the negative side effects." 7° As a result,
cities may thrive by abandoning their traditional roles as centers of social,
cultural, and economic activity, and becoming temporary way stations
for the unattached, gentrified playgrounds for the wealthy, or, in
Bruegmann's words, "essentially resort areas filled with second homes."71
It is unclear, however, whether targeting the young-and those
wealthy enough to afford a comfortable, fear-and-disorder-free urban
life-is a long-term strategy for urban success. Even assuming that the
"creative class" is indeed attracted to urban life (despite the fact that most
of its members have lived from birth in suburbia), there are reasons to
worry that H.G. Wells' prediction of a century ago may be coming to
pass: "cities may now be morphing ...from commanding centers of
economic life toward a more ephemeral role as a 'bazaar, a great gallery of
shops and places of concourse and rendezvous."' 72 The fact remains that
most young professionals, even hip ones, do not remain unattached and
childless forever. When their life circumstances change, they face the
same pressures and demands that all parents face. And the research con-
necting social integration and residential tenure with collective efficacy
suggests that the most successful, safest, city neighborhoods ultimately
will be the kinds of places where people choose to make their lives long
term-to live, work, and raise families.
Unfortunately, fewer and fewer families-especially middle-class
families-build their lives in city neighborhoods. Although the extent of
concentrated poverty declined dramatically during the 1990s, central cit-
ies continue to contain a disproportionate number of poor families. 73
And while a handful of center cities are gaining wealthy residents, even
growing cities continue to lose families in general, and middle-class fami-
lies in particular. A recent Brookings Institution study of twelve large
metropolitan areas found that only 23 percent of central-city neighbor-
hoods had middle-income profiles (compared to 45 percent in 1970).
70. ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAwL: A COMPACT HISTORY 221 (2005).
71. Id.
72. KOTKIN, supra note 2, at 151 (quoting H.G. WELLS, ANTICIPATIONS OF THE
REACTION OF MECHANICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS UPON HUMAN LIFE AND
THOUGHT 32 (1902).
73. Paul A. Jargowsky, Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems: The Dramatic Decline
of Concentrated Poverty in the 1990s, in 2 REDEFINING URBAN & SUBURBAN AMERICA
137 (Berube et al. eds., 2005); Alan Berube & William H. Frey, A Decade of Mixed
Blessings: Urban and Suburban Poverty in Census 2000, in 2 REDEFINING URBAN & SUB-
URBAN AMERICA, supra, at 111.
74. See Jason C. Booza et al., Brookings Inst., Where Did They Go?: The Decline
of Middle-Income Neighborhoods in Metropolitan America 9-11 (2006), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2006/O6poverty-booza/20060622-
middleclass.pdf.
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III. DISORDER, FEAR, AND THE
ORDER-MAINTENANCE AGENDA
Convincing middle-income families with children to forego the
amenities of suburbia and make their lives in cities-or, perhaps at least
as importantly, to remain in any given urban neighborhood long enough
to build the social capital needed to support a healthy urban life-obvi-
ously is no small task. But order-maintenance policies may prove critical
to achieving this goal for three related, and underappreciated, reasons.
First, recall that wealthier families with children are most sensitive
to fear of crime-that is, they are most likely to move if they become
fearful. 75 And, while the causal connection between disorder and crime is
hotly contested, the connection between disorder and the fear of crime is
not. Nearly all efforts to measure the connection between disorder and
fear find a strong positive correlation. People intuitively associate disorder
and crime. Apparently, the average observer agrees with the broken win-
dows hypothesis; when she sees physical disorder or experiences social
incivilities in a neighborhood, she assumes that more serious crimes are
prevalent there as well. Indeed, disorder may generate more fear of crime
than actual personal experience with crime itself, perhaps because
residents who live in disorder-plagued neighborhoods encounter disorder
on a daily basis, even if they are rarely, if ever, victimized.76
Disorder generates fear at both the neighborhood and individual
levels. At the neighborhood level, disorder is not only positively corre-
lated with fear of crime, but higher levels of disorder correspond to
higher levels of fear.77 At the individual level, residents within the same
neighborhoods experience different levels of fear depending upon their
individual perceptions of the amount of disorder in their communities.
That is, the more disorder a person sees, the more fearful she is. For
example, Jeanette Covington and Ralph Taylor interviewed over 1500
residents about the levels of disorder in sixty-six Baltimore neighbor-
hoods and then compared these responses to physical assessments of
neighborhood conditions conducted by trained observers. 78 They found
that fear was mostly strongly influenced by the disorder levels within a
respondent's neighborhood. Residents of neighborhoods with higher
levels of observed physical and social disorder had higher fear levels. They
also found, moreover, that individual perceptions of disorder were
strongly linked to individualized, within-neighborhood, differences in
75. See GARNET'r, supra note 7, at 138.
76. Id. at 140-45.
77. Randy L. LaGrange et al., Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime: Role of Social and
Physical Incivilities, 29 J. REs. CRIME &DELINQUENCy 311, 312-13, 327-28 (1992);
McGarrell et al., supra note 41, at 493; Gibson et al., supra note 40, at 541.
78. Covington & Taylor, supra note 38, at 241-43.
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fear. Residents who saw more disorder than their neighbors, or expressed
greater concern about disorder, experienced more fear.
79
Second, disorder is negatively correlated with collective efficacy,
which, as discussed above, is an important predictor of both fear of crime
and residential stability. In their important study of the effects of disor-
der in Chicago neighborhoods, Robert Sampson and Stephen
Raudenbush found no significant correlation between disorder and seri-
ous crimes other than robbery. But, they also found that collective effi-
cacy was significantly and negatively correlated with disorder. There are
two possible explanations for this correlation: First, as Sampson and
Raudenbush observe, perceptions of disorder may color residents' judg-
ments about the level of cohesion and control in their community. This
observation is consistent with previous research suggesting that percep-
tions of disorder strongly influence individual perceptions of collective
efficacy. Alternatively, it is reasonable to expect that communities with
high levels of collective efficacy will be less disorderly; after all, members
of cohesive communities with high levels of social capital are most likely
to organize informally to keep disorder in check. Sampson and
Raudenbush's findings led them to reject the strong version of the bro-
ken windows thesis, which posits a causal link between disorder and seri-
ous crime. But, they took care not to dismiss disorder as irrelevant.
Disorder, they suggest, might "turn out to be important for understand-
ing migration patterns, investment by businesses, and overall neighbor-
hood viability," especially if it "operates in a cascading fashion-
encouraging people to move (increasing residential instability) or dis-
couraging efforts at building collective responses ..8.0."'
Finally, even assuming that the disorder-crime nexus is spurious,
order-maintenance policies can benefit disorder-plagued communities in
ways unrelated to curbing serious crime directly. The first of these bene-
fits flows from the fact that efforts to organize community responses to
neighborhood problems are a centerpiece of many order-maintenance
policies. Many cities' order-maintenance efforts seek to help neighbors
overcome their fears by catalyzing new forms of collective efficacy. The
CAPS program, for example, incorporates several forms of "assertive vigi-
lance." Police work with local community leaders, including pastors, to
organize marches in high-crime areas, prayer vigils at the site of gang- or
drug-related shootings, "smoke-outs" (barbeque picnics) in drug-market
areas, and "positive loitering" campaigns to harass prostitutes and their
customers. In an interview, a police officer described the evolution of a
successful positive loitering campaign to address a prostitution problem
in her district:
79. i at 241-43.
80. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 16, at 624-26. See also Gibson et al.,
supra note 40, at 552.
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The problem was brought up at the beat meeting . . . . [The
officer] proposed positive-loitering, and they agreed to give it a
try[.] ... They started out with 30 people and were escorted by a
police car. They began to alternate days and times so that the
prostitutes would never know when they'd be there. Soon the
prostitutes ran when they saw the group coming, while the police
would stop them and check for warrants, arresting them if there
were any outstanding. . . .When a community member com-
plained of seeing prostitutes from 9 pm to 11 pm, positive loiter-
ers came during those times. They got up to 60 volunteers.
8 1
There is a reason, of course, why Chicago uses public resources to kick
start collective efficacy. Low levels of social capital deprive these commu-
nities of the ability to organize informally. Order-maintenance efforts
like "positive loitering," taking their cues from the broken windows
hypothesis, flow from the belief that public intervention can reinvigorate
collective efficacy when a neighborhood self-governance disappears.
Somewhat ironically, Wilson-who is now seen as the godfather of such
efforts-questioned this assumption in The Urban Unease, arguing that
"there is relatively little government can do directly to maintain a neigh-
borhood community. It can, of course, assign more police officers to it,
but there are real limits to the value of this response. '"82
Although the apparent success of efforts like those featured in the
CAPS programs suggest that Wilson may have been correct to reconsider
this assumption, it is clear that the healthiest and safest urban communi-
ties enjoy high levels of collective efficacy without public intervention. In
these communities, neighbors know and trust one another well enough
to organize informally to address community problems.83 Still, by dis-
couraging informal social interaction among neighbors, fear diminishes
the likelihood that members of a community will organize without pub-
lic intervention.8 4 Endeavors like Chicago's "positive loitering" cam-
paigns, "smoke outs," and prayer vigils are not perfect substitutes for the
collective efficacy organically present in healthier neighborhoods. Never-
theless, they may help generate much-needed social capital in struggling
communities both by helping residents overcome fear and social isola-
tion, and by bringing together community leaders who might not other-
wise collaborate.
Consider, for example, the effects of police-sponsored prayer vigils
in troubled Chicago neighborhoods. About ten years ago, an innovative
police commander named Claudell Ervin took it upon himself to organ-
ize a massive anti-crime prayer vigil on Chicago's impoverished West
81. COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, supra note 22, at 92.
82. Wilson, supra note 42, at 34.
83. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 16, at 612-13.
84. McGarrell et al., supra note 41, at 494.
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Side. Ervin invited hundreds of church leaders to attend a meeting at the
police district headquarters; at this meeting, the group planned the vigil,
which proceeded as follows: Participants stood and prayed in groups of
ten on street corners that were usually occupied by drug dealers. Follow-
ing the vigil, the participants were joined by thousands of other residents
in a large park for a "praise celebration" featuring food, speeches, and a
400-member gospel choir. Variations of this prayer vigil have occurred
hundreds of times since. A study conducted over the two years following
the first vigil, found that the prayer vigils generated a number of impor-
tant benefits. Importantly, religious leaders' opinion of the police
improved, and they became more interested in, and likely to participate
in, crime-prevention efforts. Moreover, the vigils apparently have fostered
greater inter-denominational cooperation and have led churches and
faith-based institutions to play a more prominent role in Chicago's com-
munity policing efforts. While this result might not please strict separa-
tionists, the improved relations allow police to enlist leaders of what are,
in many inner-city neighborhoods, the most important community insti-
tutions-churches. The initial public intervention enabled subsequent
informal collective efforts to address community problems: Following the
initial vigil, an interdenominational coalition of ministers was formed to
promote subsequent vigils. And coalition meetings quickly became a
popular way for secular service providers to disseminate information.85
Perhaps more importantly, many order-maintenance policies appar-
ently make people feel safer, even if they do not actually reduce serious
crime. There is sizeable empirical literature suggesting that central ele-
ments of order-maintenance policing-especially preventative patrols
and increased police-citizen interactions-reduce the fear of crime. Over
the past several decades, a number of urban police forces have created
controlled experiments to test the effects of different policing techniques.
The pioneering experiment, the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experi-
ment, sought to measure the impact of routine motorized police
patrols.86 The goal of the experiment was to test what the researchers,
who were led (somewhat ironically) by George Kelling, characterized as
the longstanding and widely held belief that "the presence or potential
presence of police officers on patrol severely inhibits criminal activity. "87
To test this hypothesis, the Kansas City Police Department agreed to vary
the level of police presence in fifteen of the city's beats. In five "reactive"
beats, routine patrols were eliminated and officers instructed to respond
only to calls for service. In five "control" beats, routine preventative
patrols were maintained at the usual level of one car per beat. And in five
85. Tracey L. Meares & Kelsi Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together, 48
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1315, 1334, 1347, 1350 (2006-07).
86. See GEORGE KELLING ET AL., THE KANsAS CrrY PREVENTATIVE PATROL
EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT (1974).
87. Id. at 1.
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"proactive" beats, routine patrols were intensified to two or three times
the usual level.88 The researchers found that increasing police presence
had virtually no effect on crime levels, citizen satisfaction with police
service, or citizens' fear of crime.89
The Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment was interpreted at
the time as supporting a move toward reform-era, reactive, policing strat-
egies. In the preface to the final report on the experiment, for example,
the Kansas City Chief of Police asserted that the findings "repudiated a
tradition prevailing in police work for almost 150 years,"90 and "sug-
gest[ed] that deployment strategies should be based on specific crime-
prevention and service goals as opposed to routine preventive
patrol[s]."91 It is important to note, however, that the Kansas City study
focused on motorized patrols, one of the reform-era innovations that Wil-
son and Kelling criticized in Broken Windows.92 Two subsequent field
studies found that routine foot patrol do in fact reduce the fear of crime,
although they do not necessarily reduce crime itself. For example, in
1979, Flint, Michigan established a neighborhood foot patrol program
with the hope that foot patrols would prevent crime, increase police-
citizen interaction, and catalyze neighborhood organization.9 Over sev-
eral years, researchers from Michigan State University studied the effects
of the foot patrols and found that, in most of the experimental beats,
crime decreased, and importantly, that residents believed that foot patrols
had decreased crime, regardless of whether they actually had. Residents'
perception of personal safety also dramatically improved in the experi-
mental areas (especially when a foot patrol officer was present). Residents
living in the foot patrol areas also reported an increased level of commu-
nication with one another, a finding lending further support to the con-
clusion that order-maintenance policing efforts can increase
neighborhood-level social capital. 94 Similarly, the Newark Foot Patrol
Experiment, which served as the catalyst for the Broken Windows essay,
found that foot patrols reduced the fear of crime, even as actual crime
levels remained stable (or, in some cases, increased). 9 5
Evidence from controlled experiments in other cities also supports
the conclusion that certain elements of community policing can reduce
the fear of crime and improve citizen perceptions of police perform-
88. Id. at 2.
89. Id. at 2-3.
90. Id. at viii.
91. Id. at vii.
92. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 10, at 34.
93. ROBERT TROJANOWIcz, AN EVALUATION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD FOOT
PATROL PROGRAM IN FLINT, MICHIGAN 15, 19-20 (1982).
94. Id.
95. POLICE FOUNDATION, THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT (1981).
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ance. 96 For example, controlled policing experiments conducted in
Houston, Texas and Newark, New Jersey during the mid-1980s mea-
sured the effect of several community-policing techniques-including a
police-community newsletter, neighborhood-level police multi-service
centers, and frequent police contacts with residents to solicit input about
local problems. Researchers found that, in both cities, programs that fos-
tered more frequent citizen-police interactions reduced fear of crime,
resulted in lower levels of perceived crime and disorder, and improved
residents' evaluation of police service.97
Similarly, in the Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) pro-
ject, Baltimore, Maryland assigned 45 officers to new COPE units and
then varied the intensity and organization of police presence over three
years. The first year involved intensive mobile patrol in targeted areas. In
the second, officers increased their contacts with citizens, and some
mobile patrols were shifted to foot patrol. In the third year, officers
engaged in intensive problem solving and community mobilization. The
COPE program's aim was specifically the reduction of the fear of crime.
The evidence showed that fear was reduced in the transition from phase
one to phase two, but that phase three-intensive contact and problem
solving with community members-had the most significant effect on
fear reduction.9 8 Other experiments yield similar results: A comprehen-
sive review of empirical and quasi-empirical studies of the relationship
between policing strategies and fear reduction, conducted in 2002, found
that order-maintenance policing strategies reduced fear in 31 of 50 stud-
ies; 18 found no change and 1 reported an increase in fear. The authors
noted that merely increasing police presence appears to do less to reduce
fear than proactive, targeted policing efforts and community policing. 99
Interestingly, however, some studies suggest that police-citizen collabora-
tions that involve citizens directly in crime-prevention activities, such as
the prayer vigils discussed above, may actually increase fear of crime, at
least among participants.' oo
96. See generally David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce
Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 42 (2004).
97. See ANTONY M. PATE ET AL., REDUCING FEAR OF CUME IN HOUSTON AND
NEWARK: A SUMMARY REPORT 12 (1986). One exception to the finding was that police
newsletters in both cities and the disorder-reduction program in Newark appeared to have
little effect on citizens' perceptions of safety or of police performance. Id. at 31-33.
98. See Gary W. Cordner, Fear of Crime and the Police: An Evaluation of a Fear-
Reduction Strategy, 14 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 223 (1986).
99. See Jihong "Solomon" Zhao et at., The Effect of Police Presence on Public Fear
Reduction and Satisfaction: A Review of the Literature, 15 JusT. PROF. 273, 295 (2002).
100. See Brian C. Renauer, Reducing Fear of Crime: Citizen, Police, or Government
Responsibiliy?, 10 Police Q. 41, 47 (2007).
THE ORDER-MAINTENANCE AGENDA AS LAND USE POLICY
IV. THE COSTS OF ORDER
The costs of implementing the policies most likely to achieve these
benefits-including efforts to increase the frequency and quality of citi-
zen-police interactions (such as intensive community-policing efforts and
foot patrols)-are not insubstantial. This is undoubtedly one reason why
order-maintenance proponents promise that their policies will reduce
serious crime, rather than simply make people feel safer, and more vested,
in their neighborhoods. Crime rates are tangible and measurable,
reflected in official statistics. In contrast, the benefits discussed in this
Essay, such as a reduction in the fear of crime and an increase in collec-
tive efficacy, are difficult to quantify, and their very definitions contesta-
ble. The remainder of this Essay reflects upon two frequently cited
possible costs of order-maintenance policies: First, they are too
resource-intensive. Second, they threaten to undermine civil liberties. A
third potential cost-that an order-maintenance mindset may lead urban
leaders to stifle the kinds of social and economic activities necessary for a
healthy urban life-is set to one side, as I have discussed it in detail
elsewhere."' The purpose of this closing reflection is not to weigh
empirically the costs and benefits of the order-maintenance enterprise,
but rather to suggest that it is overly simplistic to conclude that, absent
proof that reducing disorder in fact reduces more serious crime, the
order-maintenance agenda should be abandoned.
A. Economic Costs
Order-maintenance policing tactics are resource-intensive. Some,
like Mayor Giuliani's "quality of life" policing practices, require police
departments to devote significant resources to the arrest and processing
of individuals for relatively minor offenses. Others, such as foot patrols,
require the enlistment of more officers, if only for the simple reason that
an officer, or team of officers, can cover far more ground in a car than on
foot. The most predominant order-maintenance technique, community
policing, requires officers to devote significant time to building commu-
nity relations, attending community meetings, etc., and also tends to
expand the range of problems on officers' plates.O 2 Some critics, there-
fore, have used data questioning the crime-disorder nexus to argue that
order-maintenance policing does not make economic sense. For example,
Bernard Harcourt and Jens Ludwig have argued that the available evi-
dence fails to "support the view that shifting policing toward minor dis-
order offenses would improve the efficiency of police spending and
reduce violent crime. " 103 While Harcourt and Ludwig agree with order-
101. See Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, supra note 19.
102. GARN=rr, supra note 7, at 16-17.
103. Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from
New York City anda Five-City Social Fxperiment, 73 U. CHi. L. REv. 271, 315 (2006).
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maintenance proponents that "police matter," they urge that other prac-
tices, for example intensive policing in criminal "hot spots," represent a
better allocation of policing resources."°4
B. Civil-Liberties Costs
Among the concerns critics raise, perhaps the most troubling is the
assertion that order-maintenance policing techniques threaten civil liber-
ties, especially of poor minorities who live in struggling urban neighbor-
hoods. This prediction reflects a deep skepticism of police discretion.
Critics worry that order-maintenance policies present opportunities for
police abuses by increasing the frequency and intensity of police-citizen
interactions and failing to channel the discretion that officers necessarily
exercise during them. 10 5 Critics also express concern that the emphasis
on police-citizen interactions will politicize police practices, inviting the
kind of corruption that reform-era innovations sought to eliminate and
causing officers to side with citizens whom they know well or believe to
be politically influential.10 6 If officers become too close to the citizens
that they are assigned to protect, they might begin to enforce "vigilante
values" rather than the criminal laws.
10 7
Order-maintenance proponents counter that increasing the police-
citizen interaction and collaboration diminishes, rather than exacerbates,
the risk of abuse and corruption. As Tracey Meares has asserted:
Critics of community policing fear that encouraging the align-
ment of law enforcement and community interests will result in
the compromise of individual rights-usually criminal-procedural
rights. Yet... aligning the interests of those in high-crime urban
neighborhoods with the goals of law enforcement might well
enable residents ... to hold law enforcers accountable in order to
better guide their exercise of discretion.
10 8
The highly militarist "law enforcement" policing model, according to
this view, encourages officers to consider themselves crime-fighting war-
riors who are pitted against lawless citizens, enemies who are unworthy of
their respect and protection.10 9 Stephen Mastrofski and Jack Green
104. Id. at 314-15.
105. See, e.g., GAtNETr, supra note 7, at 18-21.
106. See Mark Harrison Moore, Problem-Solving and Community Policing, 15
CRIME & JusT. 99, 145 (1992); David H. Bayley, Community Policing: A Reportfrom the
Devils Advocate, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 225 (Jack R. Greene
& Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988).
107. Stephen D. Mastrofski & Craig D. Uchida, Transforming the Police, 30 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 330, 348 (1993).
108. Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1593,
1595-96 (2002).
109. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYrE, ABOVE THE LAW:
POLICE AND THE EXCESSrVE USE OF FORCE (1993); Debra Ann Livingston, Brutality in
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express this sentiment slightly differently, arguing that community polic-
ing will give greater weight to "men" in the balance between "laws and
men," reasoning that "the bonds of formal law and bureaucratic rules
must be loosened to allow police policies and practices to be guided by
community norms and sentiments."11 °
It is also possible that vesting police officers with more discretion
ultimately will improve police officers' attitudes about the legal rights of
citizens. As Jerome Skolnick and James Fyfe have argued, the "crime
fighting" model of policing "has had the effect of putting the police on
the front lines of crime wars they cannot win." 1 1 Some lose heart and
become frustrated and demoralized; others become convinced that "they
are losing the war only because others ...have handcuffed them. They
hear fundamental Constitutional principles and due process rights ...
described as technicalities and unreasonable limits on their ability to fight
the enemy among us. ' " The turn toward problem-oriented or commu-
nity policing, prompted by the order-maintenance agenda, might, as
Mark Moore has suggested, encourage officers to view themselves as
"street corner judges" rather than "street corner politicians," and to begin
to perceive legal rights as valuable tools for resolving disputes rather than
constraints that limit their ability to perform their jobs effectively.1 13
Unfortunately, not enough is known about the connection between
policing techniques and police behavior. Some commentators have
sought to connect order-maintenance policing techniques, especially the
aggressive misdemeanor arrest practices that characterize New York City's
quality of life policing efforts, with an increase in excessive force inci-
dents. A comprehensive review of national and local data on the use of
force, conducted for the National Institute of Justice in 1999, however,
concluded that virtually no data exists on how different policing tech-
niques affect the use of force.1 14 A more recent nationwide survey of
police officers from 113 departments, conducted by the Police Founda-
tion in 2001, found that officers overwhelmingly rejected the idea that
community-oriented policing increases abuse of authority (including cor-
ruption and excessive force). Most officers, however, also rejected the
proposition that community policing decreases the risk of corruption,
Blue: Community, Authority, and the Elusive Promise of Police Reform, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1556 (1994) (reviewing JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW:
POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993)).
110. Stephen D. Mastrofski & Jack R. Greene, Community Policing and the Rule of
Law, in POLICE INNOVATION AND CONTROL OF THE POLICE 80, 80 (David Weisburd &
Craig Uchida eds., 1993).
111. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 109, at 114.
112. Id.
113. Moore, supra note 106, at 145 (quoting WILLIAM KER MUIR, JR., POLICE:
STREETCORNER POLITICIANS (1977)).
114. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, USE OF FORCE BY POLICE: OVERVIEW OF
NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA ix (1999).
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although a slight majority believed that community policing reduces the
risk of excessive force incidents. These findings are generally consistent
with other studies seeking to gauge police attitudes about community
policing. Indeed, officers report that community policing improves their
morale and their relationships with citizens.115
Positive police attitudes toward community policing are certainly a
hopeful sign. Ultimately, however, as now-judge Debra Livingston has
observed, whether order-maintenance policies, especially problem-solving
and community policing, act to curb police abuses may be inextricably
linked with whether they enable police to successfully address real com-
munity problems.116 Skolnik and Fyfe may be right that asking police to
engage in an unwinnable "war" on crime leads to cynicism, alienation,
and even brutality among the ranks. If so, it seems likely officers are least
likely to feel frustrated and cynical if they are asked to identify and
accomplish achievable goals. The sizable literature investigating the fac-
tors that influence public satisfaction with the police tends to support
Judge Livingston's hypothesis. One of the most important predictors of
public satisfaction with the police is public perception that the police are
doing their job effectively. For example, fear of crime is inversely related
to public satisfaction with police performance; that is, the safer people
feel, the happier they are with police performance. Interestingly, citizens
who fear the police-that is, who are afraid that police will abuse their
authority-also express high levels of fear of crime, suggesting a different
kind of connection between police performance and public satisfac-
tion.117 There is undoubtedly a risk that expanding the universe of polic-
ing priorities to include order-maintenance and other community
problems will overwhelm officers with tasks with which they are ill-
equipped to deal.11
It is less clear under what circumstances order-maintenance policing
practices improve public satisfaction with the police. The early foot
patrol experiments, discussed above, found that increasing police pres-
ence in a neighborhood led both citizens and police officers to report that
police performance improved. In Boston, foot patrols became so popular
that local politicians quickly seized upon the opportunity to take credit
for their deployment, with some issuing press releases when additional
officers were assigned to a neighborhood. Other studies, however, indi-
cate that increased police presence does not itself improve public satisfac-
tion, although policing techniques that successfully reduce fear of crime
115. Richard E. Adams et al., Implementing Community-Oriented Policing: Organi-
zational Change and Street Officer Attitudes, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 399, 424 (2002).
116. See Livingston, supra note 109, at 1574-75.
117. Brian Renauer, Reducing Fear of Crime: Citizen, Police, or Government Respon-
sibility?, 10 POLICE Q. 41, 46 (2007).
118. See, e.g., Adams et al., supra note 115, at 423.
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do.' 19 For example, community policing activities tend to improve citi-
zens' evaluation of police performance: A 2003 evaluation of data from
twelve cities, collected by the U.S. Justice Department's Bureau of Justice
Statistics and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,
found a strong correlation between increased community policing efforts
and citizen satisfaction with the police.120 And the connection between
community policing efforts and citizen satisfaction apparently holds true
across all racial groups. In Chicago, the researchers conducting the ten-
year review of the CAPS program found that while perceptions of police
performance had improved among all racial groups, the gap between the
perceptions of whites and other racial groups did not close."'2 While the
continued gap is cause for concern, overall increase in policing satisfac-
tion remains hopeful, especially because minorities tend simultaneously
to demand increased levels of police protection and to express high levels
of distrust for police officers. It is also promising that minority police
officers often express higher levels of support for community policing
than their white counter parts.22
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay expands the discussion of the order-maintenance agenda
beyond the narrow question of whether order-maintenance-policing
techniques reduce serious crime. By highlighting the important distinc-
tion between crime reduction and fear reduction, I hope to illustrate that
order-maintenance policies might "work" even if they do not reduce seri-
ous crime. Importantly, order-maintenance policies may mitigate the
negative effects of the fear of crime, including reduced levels of collective
efficacy and residential stability. These things matter intensely to cities
and their neighborhoods; crime rates tell only part of a city's story.
Nothing in this Essay should be interpreted as suggesting that the
potential benefits of fear-reduction necessarily justify all of the myriad
policies falling under the order-maintenance umbrella. I am ill-equipped
to weigh the not-insignificant costs of any of these policies, or some com-
bination of them, against any set of potential benefits. The order-mainte-
nance policing techniques that appear to be most successful at reducing
the fear of crime-foot patrols and community policing-are also per-
haps the most resource-intensive. Some have suggested that other, less-
resource-intensive policing techniques (for example, "hot spots" policing)
do more to reduce actual crime.' 23 If so, policies that simply make people
119. See Zhao et al., supra note 99.
120. Matthew C. Scheider et al., The Impact of Citizen Perceptions of Community
Policing on Fear of Crime: Findings from Twelve Cities, 6 POLICE Q. 363, 377 (2003).
121. COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, supra note 22, at 43-44.
122. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 16, at 611.
123. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Fair and Effective Policing, in CRIME: PUBLIC
POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL 383 Games Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia, eds. 2002).
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feel safer might not represent the best allocation of scarce law-enforce-
ment resources.
Moreover, generalizations about the order-maintenance agenda are
themselves problematic because of the dramatic differences among the
various policies falling under the order-maintenance umbrella. For exam-
ple, the apparent link between order-maintenance policing efforts,
including community policing, and improved satisfaction with the police
may mitigate concerns that order-maintenance policies may lead to dis-
criminatory enforcement. But general expressions of satisfaction with
community policing efforts should not be interpreted as an endorsement
of all order-maintenance tactics. Chicago's community policing efforts
stand in sharp contrast, for example, to the aggressive policies of misde-
meanor arrests that characterized New York's order-maintenance efforts
during Rudolph Giuliani's mayoralty. Local government officials should
take care to attend to, and consider the potential civil-liberties implica-
tions of, these distinctions.
